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Abstract: This research is conducted to quantitatively measure the relationship between corruption and public investment at 
municipalities‟ level in Indonesia. According to Nash Equilibrium derived from mixed strategies, the relationship between corruption 
and public investment can be both positive and negative depending on the level of the corruption Index. Moreover, the econometric 
estimations from cross section data and pooled data consistently confirm that the relationship between corruption and public 
investment is in non linear quadratic form. It was found that the public investment reaches the lowest level when the corruption index 
ranges from 4.42-4.64.  
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1. Introduction 
In Indonesia, corruption has become one of the major political and economic issues in recent years both 
pre and post Suharto‟s era. In the era of Suharto, the nature of corruption in Indonesia was more centralized and 
thus was more predictable. However, the post-Suharto era has resulted in a different kind of corruption triggered 
by changes in the political system. The old, highly centralized system has been transformed and replaced by a 
large decentralized system in which power and authority are more diffused. As a consequence, the corruption is 
now more fragmented with the local government officials and local legislative members having a dominant role as 
the actors (Kuncoro, 2004 and 2006). A recent survey by Transparency International Indonesia (henceforth TII) in 
2008 showed that corruption in Indonesia is commonly found in activities related to business licenses/permits, 
bureaucratic process, public contracts/tenders and judicial decisions. 
Related to public contracts/tenders, public investment projects have frequently lent to elites or those 
responsible for acts of high-level corruption or rent seeking. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997,1998), utilizing 
cross-country data, showed that higher levels of corruption is associated with higher public investment, and leads 
to a reduction in the project‟s  productivity, a lowering of government revenue and expenditure on operations and 
maintenances, and a diminishing quality of public infrastructure. However, they also argued that corruption is 
likely to increase public investment. This may arise because public investment can be easily manipulated by 
powerful political or bureaucratic personalities, and often gives rise to the payment of higher “commissions” by 
those who carry out the project. On the other hand, Mauro (1995), also using cross country data, found that 
corruption reduces total investment and thereby slows down economic growth. A similar result is also shown by 
Sarkar and Hasan (2001). By using Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index, this study showed 
that corruption reduces both the volume and efficiency of investment and economic growth. 
 Given the fragmented nature of corruption in Indonesia and its effect on worsening the economy, it is 
important to conduct quantitative research measuring the relationship between corruption and public investment at 
the municipalities‟ level in Indonesia. This article consists of two main parts. The first section describes the game 
theory model to explain the relationship between corruption and public investment. The second part discusses the 
econometrics model and the results. The model is used to verify whether the relationship between corruption and 
public investment is in line with the solution of game theory. 
 
2. The theoretical model: the corruption-public investment game 
This study develops a simple theoretical game in order to analyze the relationship between corruption 
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and public investment. The so called corruption public investment game consists of two rational players, an 
individual public official (called player 1) and a Corruption Eradication Commission (henceforth CEC) as a part 
of government body (called player 2)
2
. The strategy of player 1 is to decide whether to corrupt or not to corrupt 
meanwhile the strategy of player 2 is to do strict supervision highly or just low. The payoff function of each player 
and strategies are represented in Table 1. This payoff draws upon Becker‟s (1968) analysis of crime in general, 
Rose-Ackerman‟s (1975) analysis of the economics of corruption and Macrae‟s (1982) idea of game theory 
approach on the economics of corruption. 
Table 1 Payoff Matrix of Corruption-Investment Game 
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Let w be a wage rate. r is a fraction/percentage of rent seeking behavior resulting from government 
projects on public works. K is an amount of public investments. I is a corruption perception index, ranging from 0 
(most corrupt) to 10 (cleanest). J(I) is penalties/costs paid by an individual public official when he/she is detected 
and arrested due to corruption
3
. R(I) is a reward to an individual public official for not doing corrupt activities. 
Thus, the benefits from not being detected as being corrupt received by an official are (w+rK). On the other hand, 
the benefits of being detected are (w+rK-J(I)). Moreover, the benefits received by an individual public official 
from not being corrupt are w+R(I). Since the condition of corruption acceptable to the public official is rK > R(I), 
the corruptions are economically rational.       
Let us assume J is a continuous decreasing function in the corruption index (I),    IJIIJ  < 0. 
This implies that the paid costs or penalties in a corrupt system are larger than that of in non corrupt one
4
. Further, 
we assume that the second derivative of J(I) is negative following the law of diminishing 
returns,    IJIIJ  22 < 0, on the contrary, R(I) is a continuous increasing function in I, 
   IRIIR   > 0. These assumptions imply that a clean government system will create a better reward and 
punishment system for public officials, thus an increase in I will increase the reward R. That is the same as J(I), 
the second derivate of R(I) is negative,    IRIIR  22 < 0.  
Moreover, M represents the government‟s credibility and public trust and C(I) is supervision costs as a 
function of the corruption index. If the government/CEC commits to a strict supervision and is able to catch 
perpetrators of corruption, they will get benefits, K-rK+M-C(I). We assume that the benefit from government 
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credibility and public trust (M) are larger than the costs of combating corruption (C). Therefore, the activities 
against corruption by a ruling government are economically rational. C is a continuous increasing function in I, 
   ICIIC  > 0 and the negative second derivative,    ICIIC  22 < 0. The high value of I 
represents more budgets or resources allocated in recruiting new employee for supervision, investing online 
procurement, and creating a fair justice system and reforming a remuneration system which are needed to develop 
an accountable and clean government.   
 The Nash Equilibrium is derived under assumptions as rK-J(I) < R(I) and rK < M. The first assumption 
means that the net benefits of committing corrupt acts under a strict supervision are smaller than the net benefits 
of not being corrupt. It follows that every public official will commit corrupt acts if the net benefits of committing 
corrupt acts are larger that of not being corruption. It contradicts the facts that supervision is aimed to reduce 
corruption. The second assumption means that the value of the government's credibility and public trust is greater 
than or equal to the value of corrupted public investments. If this assumption is violated there is no rational reason 
for the ruling government to eradicate corruptions. 
By definition, the strategy-i is a Nash Equilibrium if, for each player-i, strategy-i is player i‟s best 
response to the strategies of the n-1 other players. In this game, the chosen individual public official is the best 
response to the strategies of government (CEC). According to the payoff matrix in the table 1, if CEC chooses to 
commit to implementing strict supervision, a public official‟s best response is not to be corrupt. However, if CEC 
does not commit to fight corruption, which means low supervision, an individual public official‟s best response is 
corruption. In contrast, if an individual public official chooses to actively corruptly/not corruptly the government‟s 
best response is strict supervision/low supervision.  
Following the conditions, a Nash Equilibrium does not exist in this game because the solution to such a 
game necessarily involves uncertainty about what players will do. We introduce the notion of a mixed strategy, 
which we will interpret in terms of one player‟s uncertainty about what another player will do. Thus a mixed 
strategy for player-i is a probability distribution  iKii ppp ,...,1 , where 10  iKp  for k=1,…,K and 
1...1  iKi pp  (Gibbons, 1992). 
In this game, a mixed strategy for CEC is the distribution function (p,1-p), where p is the probability of 
committing strict supervision and 1-p is the probability of committing low supervision, and 10  p . 
Furthermore, a mixed strategy for an individual public official is the distribution function (q,1-q), where q is the 
probability of committing corrupt acts, 1-q is the probability of not committing corrupt acts, and 10  q . 
Therefore the solution of p can be derived by following the expected profit of an individual public official as 
shown below: 
       rKwpIJrKwpE corrupt  1  
   rKwIpJ         (1) 
    ))((1))(( IRwpIRwpE corruptnot   
)(IRw         (2) 
Substituting eq. 2 into eq. 1, we get: 
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Eq. 3 intuitively shows an increase in rent seeking behavior (rK) followed by an increase in the probability of 
strict supervision. In contrast strict supervision needed to reduce corrupt activities, an increase in penalties/costs 
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and the reward systems lowers the probability of strict supervision. Further, Eq. 4 intuitively shows a strict 
supervision in a government system will increase the public investment because the public official will work as 
efficiently/effectively as possible. An increase in the penalties/costs J(I) and the reward system R(I) raises public 
investment since the public official avoids penalties by being involved in corruption. In contrast the rent seeking 
behavior (r) reduces public investment.  
From eq. 4 we can derive the impact of the corruption index (I) on public investment (K). The first order 
condition of Eq. 4 is shown as below; 
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r
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        (5)  
Suppose to  IJ  < 0and  IR > 0 then IK   can be both positive and negative depends on the level of I itself. 
If )(IJp  > )(IR then IK   will be negative and if )(IJp  < )(IR  then IK   will be positive. Moreover, 
IK  will be zero which is called as turning point, when )()( IRIJp  . Therefore, the relationship between 
public investment and corruption will be positive which means low corruption will increase public investment 
when the reward system is well developed. On the contrary, the relationship will be negative when the reward 
system is not well developed yet and the punishment system is dominated.  
 
3. Model specification 
I propose an econometric model to quantitatively measure the relationship between corruption and public 
investment based on the solution of the corruption public investment game. In order to capture the phenomena of 
Eq. 5, we propose a quadratic function of an econometric model. In addition, the quadratic function permits us to 
discern the value of the corruption index which can minimize/maximize public investment. The econometric 
model is shown as: 
iiiii gdrbcapcorruptcorruptdevrev   )log(14
2
131211    (6) 
iiiii vpopcorruptcorruptdevgrdp  )log(24
2
232221     (7) 
Where, devrev is a public investment represented by the ratio between expenditure of development to 
total revenue and devgrdp is the public investment represented by a ratio between development expenditure to 
gross regional domestic product
5
; corrupt is the corruption perception index; grdpcap is income per capita; pop is 
number of the population; i and iv are error term; and lastly, i represents region. The data of development 
expenditure are calculated from the regional budget of each municipality published by the Ministry of Finance 
while regional income per capita and population refers to the publication of Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS)
6
. 
Instead of an absolute value, we use a ratio to lessen the effect of large variation in the development 
expenditure among regions due to populations and the area size. A region with high income per capita may need 
more public investments both in quantity and quality but the size if the population may reduce the quantity of 
public investment. The populous regions commonly also have many public officials so a larger budget must be 
allocated on routine expenditures such as salary which might reduce a portion of public investment. Therefore, we 
use regional income per capita in Eq. 5 and population in Eq. 6 as control variables. In addition, to check the 
consistency of the relationship between corruption and public investment, the magnitude of corruption‟s 
coefficients in both equations must be the same.  
We estimate these models by utilizing both 2004 cross-section data and pooled data of 2004/2006. 
However, we have difficulties employing a large data set because the data of regional corruption index is very 
limited. TII in 2004 surveyed only 21 cities/municipalities which were conducted among 1,305 business people 
                                                   
5 Public investment (development expenditure) is all expenditure such as education, health, infrastructure, etc. in the regional 
budget except wages/salaries for public officials.  
6 The regional budget of municipalities in Indonesia can be accessed at the Ministry of Finance homepage: 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/datadjpk/71/.  
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from the cities/regions
7
. In addition, in 2006, TII conducted surveys in 32 districts / cities, with a total of 1,760 
respondents. The corruption index is on a 10-point scale where 0 means corrupt/bad and 10 means clean/good. 
Furthermore, the aim of estimating the models both using cross-section data and pooled data is to obtain robust 
estimation and consistent results. This has the advantage of enabling us to control the unobservable 
region-specific-characteristics that may be correlated with corruption and public investment. In addition, the 
method enables us to control regions and time invariant variables where a time series or cross section study cannot 
do (Baltagi, 1995).  
  
4. The non linear relationship between corruption and public investment 
Estimation using least squares and pooled least squares provide statistically strong evidence of a 
non-linear relationship between corruption and public investment. Table 2 shows that the magnitude of all 
corruption coefficients is at the same direction indicating consistent results. The second model with DEVGRDP as 
dependent variable provides lower standard errors of regression both in the cross section and the pooled 
estimation.  
The coefficients of corruption perception index in each model are -110.07, -14.59, -92.43 and -16.62 
respectively. However, the coefficients of corruption squared index are 12.27, 1.61, 9.97 and 1.88 respectively. 
This means that the corruption index negatively influences public investment while its square moves in the 
opposite direction. Since the higher the corruption index the cleaner the system, the eradication of corruption 
represented by a higher corruption index will reduce the share of development expenditure while the marginal 
effect of eradicating corruption will increase the share of public investment. This confirms the U-shaped form of 
the relationship between corruption and public investment. These findings are in line with the solution of 
corruption public investment game that the relationship could be both positive and negative depending on the 
level of the corruption index.   
 
Table 2 Regression Result 
Variables 
Least Squares Pooled Least Squares 
DEVREV DEVGRDP DEVREV DEVGRDP 
         
Constant 131.72 39.10 82.84 44.49 
  1.14 1.92* 1.09 118.35*** 
Corruption Perception Index -110.07** -14.59 -92.43 -16.62 
  -2.55 -1.79* -2.04** -23.45*** 
Corruption Perception Squared Index 12.27 1.61 9.97 1.88 
  2.70** 1.81* 1.93* 20.38*** 
Log(GRDPCAP) 8.78  10.18  
  4.84***  10.08***  
Log(Population)  -0.35  -0.47 
   -0.94  -5.67*** 
      
R-Squared 0.53 0.29 0.28 0.47 
F-Statistic 6.49 2.36 4.36 9.98 
S.E of Regression 8.234 1.011 11.155 1.184 
Observation 21 21 38 38 
Source: Author’s estimation 
Notes: Figures in italic are t-statistic. The standard errors are corrected due to heterocedasticity.  
***,**,* are significant at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent respectively.  
                                                   
7 This index was calculated as the average scores of perception by the bribe payers on public contract and service performance index. 
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Batam, Jakarta, Bekasi, Wonosobo Regency, Semarang, Yogjakarta, Surabaya, Tangerang, Cilegon, Denpasar, Banjarmasin, Kota 
Baru, Balikpapan, Manado, and Makassar. However, Jakarta and Kota Baru are not included in the pooled data.  
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According to the U-shaped form, both corrupt and non-corrupt regions tend to have a larger share of 
development expenditure. Along with Tanzi (1997) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1998), in a region where the 
corruption is higher, the public investment is also higher. In high-level corruption or rent seeking, high level 
officials are the decision makers of public investment regarding in terms of its scale and composition. This may 
distort such public projects been carried out specifically to provide some individuals or political groups with 
opportunities to receive “commissions” from the project implementers. Government officials, in collusion with 
local legislative members, sometimes decide budget allocation in accordance with orders from private companies. 
Hence, the decision of budget allocation for public investment projects is based on the commission offered and 
received from the third parties instead of on the basis of the cost benefit analysis. 
However, the public investment will decrease along with the campaign against corruption and the 
combating activities represented by an improvement of the corruption index. At this stage, the number of private 
companies which were previously privileged to order public projects, and which colluded with government 
officials and local legislative members to allocate budget based on “commission received”, sharply decrease due 
to high supervision from the Corruption Eradication Commission and media‟s focus on corrupt activities. In 
addition, the budget is allocated based on the cost benefit analysis and the local needs, thus public investment is 
not as much as before.  
A further consequence of the campaign against corruption is that many government officials refuse to be 
appointed as a project leader. The rejection of this position is because of anxiety over being arrested as a 
corruption defendant after the project finished. Another corollary is in the business side where many companies 
fail to fulfill the requirements of public projects bidding such as tax clearance, tax registering, submitting financial 
statements, etc. In some cases, many projects are offered without bidders interested in participating in the tender 
causes the project to fail to be completed on time and the process to be repeated and take a longer time. Moreover, 
the law enforcement which has not implemented perfectly yet forces the interested private companies to wait and 
see. Therefore, an under developed either prudential system of project tenders or law enforcement might delay 
implementation of some projects and the public investment will decrease along with an improvement in the 
corruption index. 
According to the U-shaped form, the ratio of development expenditure to total revenue will reach the 
lowest/minimum value when the corruption index equals 4.49 in 2004 and 4.64 in pooled data. Moreover, the ratio 
of development expenditure to gross regional domestic product will attain the lowest value when the corruption 
index equals 4.53 in 2004 and 4.42 in pooled data. Generally, the public investment reaches the lowest value when 
the corruption index ranges from 4.42-4.64. In those regions having a corruption index below the turning point, 
the public investment decreases along with the improvement in the corruption index. In contrast, in those regions 
having a corruption index larger than the turning point, the public investment and corruption index move in the 
same direction which means the public investment will increase in conjunction with an increase in the corruption 
index. TII‟s survey showed the average of regional corruption index was 4.69 in 2004 and 4.72 in 2006, thus most 
of regions were just past the turning point.  
One of reasons why the public investment and the corruption index moved in the same direction when 
the corruption index is greater than 4.42-4.64 is that both law enforcement and reward/remuneration systems are 
well developed so there is little incentive for corruption by public officials. Consequently, either the total revenue 
share of development expenditure or the GRDP share of development expenditure tends to be higher because 
some of development expenditure/public investment is not diverted to the pockets of public officials. Moreover, 
the budget allocations are decided along with the schedule, in a transparent and well targeted way, based on the 
cost benefit analysis and the needs of the local people. In general, a low level of corruption represented by a high 
corruption index has been demonstrated to be positively correlated with the achievement of better investment rates, 
particularly through the building of institutions in support markets. This enhances efficiency in market and 
bureaucracy, fairness in business, trust in society, and reduces transaction costs and uncertainty in the economy. 
This finding supports Mauro (1995) which institutional efficiency encourages a high investment. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The Nash Equilibrium derived from mixed strategies proves that the relationship between corruption 
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and public investment can be both positive and negative depending on the level of the corruption Index. The 
estimation results from both the cross section data and the pooled data show that the relationship between 
corruption and public investment is a non-linear quadratic, U-shaped form. Both corrupt and non corrupt regions 
tend to have a larger share of development expenditure. However, a larger share in the corrupt regions is caused 
by rent seeking behavior in which government officials try to allocate a larger budget on public projects in order 
to acquire commission from private companies. In contrast, a larger share in the non corrupt regions is a result of 
institutional efficiency. Even though most regions in Indonesia are at the lowest level of public investment, great 
efforts to eradicate corruption would likely have an immediate effect of increasing public investment. However, 
the empirical investigation using a longer longitudinal data as well as more regional samples needs to be done in 
order to check the consistency result.   
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